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Federal Law Review
ENFORCING THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
CRAIG M BRADLEY*
I INTRODUCTION
A recent submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional
and Legal Affairs said this about the Australian law of criminal procedure:
The recent law of criminal investigation is governed by a confusing "amalgam
of common law, statutory law, court-directed practices and internal police
regulations" .... A policeman's non-observance of [a citizen's rights] may lead
to internal disciplinary procedures, but it does not constitute an offence nor give
the suspect a cause of action [or, necessarily lead to exclusion of the evidence].'
Several months of studying the law of criminal investigation in Australia
have led me to agree with this conclusion. It is the purpose of this article
to discuss what that law is, but to do so in the only context that has any
meaning in the real world of law enforcement. That is, in the context of
remedies, specifically exclusionary remedies, for police misconduct. As the
United States Supreme Court has observed, without a requirement that illegally
obtained evidence must be suppressed, the constitutional prohibition against
"unreasonable searches and seizures" is no more than "a form of words,
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of human
liberties". 2 Thus, the Supreme Court, basing its decision in part on the fact
that a majority of the states already had a mandatory exclusionary rule, 3
required all states to exclude evidence obtained as a result of police misconduct.
A recent study has concluded that "the exclusionary rule has acted as a
strong institutional deterrent prompting the [Chicago] police department, the
State attorney's office, and the local narcotics courts to develop programs
and procedures designed to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment".4
It is irrelevant what judicial or statutory admonitions may be declared
to govern the police. If these admonitions are not backed up by a consistently
applied system of remedies for non-compliance, then they are nothing but
* Senior Fulbright Scholar, Australian National University. Professor of Law, Indiana University
(Bloomington) School of Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Faculty
of Law, Australian National University for their hospitality and helpfulness and to the
Australian-American Educational Foundation for their financial support of this venture.
Particular thanks to David Feldman, Geoff Lindell and Peter Waight for their helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this article.
Submission by the Victorian Council of Civil Liberties Inc, 22 July 1985, in Senate Standing
Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, A Bill of Rights for Australia? (1985) 154
(quoting P Sallmannn and J Willis, Criminal Justice in Australia (1984) 19). Sallmann and
Willis continue: "[l]n a sphere of activity involving issues of fundamental human liberty the
governing rules are unclear, uncertain, out-of-date, difficult to find and understand and thus
quite... unsuitable for the age in which we live": ibid 20.
2 Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643, 660 (1961).
3 Ibid 651.
4 M W Orfield, Jr "The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago
Narcotics Officers" (1986) 54 U Chi L Rev 1016, 1017. This squares with my own experience
as a prosecutor in Washington, DC. The study further concludes that "judicial suppression,
and the actions that police officials take in response to suppression 'punish' officers for
conducting illegal searches": ibid 1027-1028. The police themselves seem to agree that the
exclusionary rule is a good thing: ibid 1051.
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empty words. 5 In 1977, Justice Lucas, studying the behaviour of the
Queensland police, had this to say:
In the ... cases of oppressive conduct discussed . . .we see one factor common
to all, that is the exercise of personal power undisturbed by thoughts that there
will ever be an accounting for its use. 6
While it is certainly the case in Australia that police abuses of a citizen's
rights are the exception rather than the rule, still, the uneasy feeling persists,
kindled by newspaper reports7 and commissions of inquiry,8 that, when the
police want to run roughshod over rights they feel that they may do so
with impunity. This is so both because the rights, and the remedies for the
violations of these rights, are in no sense made clear, either to the police
or the citizenry. As one Australian judge put it, "it is useless to complain
of police overstepping the mark if it takes a day's research to find out where
the mark is".9 This said, it is the goal of this article to try to set out, insofar
as they can be set out, the Australian 'rules' concerning evidentiary exclusion
as they pertain to violations of the rights against self-incrimination and
unreasonable search and seizure, to offer a comparison to the American
approach to these areas, and to discuss some of the proposals for reform
that have been offered.
5 The Australian Law Reform Commission, (Report No 2 An Interim Report) Criminal
Investigation (1975) para 287 (cited subsequently as LRC Criminal Investigation) agrees: "Rights
without remedies may be no more than rhetoric; duties without sanctions for their breach
may as well not be imposed. . . . [T]he great failing of criminal procedure hitherto has not
so much been its principles .. .but rather the failure of the law on the ground to conform
with the law on the books."
6 Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Enforcement of Criminal Law in Queensland (cited
subsequently as the Lucas Report) (1977) 91.
7 Two examples of police conduct that would have 'shocked the conscience' of American courts
were reported in the Canberra Times. In the first, Melbourne "police completely demolished
a house yesterday in a search for clues to the Walsh Street police murders, but found nothing".
This was done on the authority of a bankruptcy judge after the owners of the house were
evicted; (they had not kept up their mortgage payments, apparently because they were in
custody): the Canberra Times 6 January 1989, p 4.
The second case is bizarre: "Armed and hooded police burst into an outer Brisbane home,
fired stun grenades, tied up the owner and then realised they had raided the wrong house".
The owner, a 55 year old pensioner reported that "three masked men had dragged him at
gunpoint into the lounge .. .and tied him up with tape". "They threatened to kill anyone
who moved," he said. Moreover, they bulldozed the front fence. All this, not in a search
of a mass murderer, but for a "dangerous bank robber". No mention of a warrant appears
in the article: the Canberra Times 15 January 1989, p 2. This debacle was widely reported
in the newspapers and was obviously considered extremely bad form on the part of the police.
However, the impression I got was that it wasn't the police conduct per se that was considered
so outrageous, but only that they had the wrong house.
8 In addition to the Lucas Report, supra n 6, see also, Report of the Board of Inquiry into
Allegations Against Members of the Victoria Police Force (1978) (cited subsequently as the
Beach Report); LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5; Australian Law Reform Commission
(Report No 38), Evidence (1987) (cited subsequently as LRC Evidence).
9 Mr Justice M D Kirby, "Controls Over Investigation of Offences and Pre-trial Treatment
of Suspects: Criminal Investigation and the Rule of Law" (1979) 53 ALJ 626, 651, quoting
Lord Devlin "Police Powers and Responsibilities: Common Law, Statutory and Discretionary"
(1967) 2 1 Australian Police Journal 112, 122.
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2 EXCLUSIONARY RULES
A General Observations
Australia does have a considerable body of law relating to evidentiary
exclusion due to irregularities in the conduct of an investigation by the
authorities.10 However, it is not so well developed that it could be considered
an 'exclusionary rule'. That is, as previously mentioned, the police have no
particular expectation that if they break the rules, the evidence will be lost.
Such exclusion does sometimes occur but, as the Australian Law Reform
Commission observed in 1975, if unlawfully obtained evidence "is relevant
it is almost invariably admitted into evidence"." As a result of later court
decisions, a more recent commentator has been a bit more positive about
the situation, 12 but it still seems to be the case, as the Lucas Report observed,
that Australian police are, in general, "undisturbed " 13 by fear of evidentiary
exclusion, or any other remedy 4 for rights violations.
The notion that "it matters not how you get [evidence]; if you steal it
even, it would be admissible in evidence," 5 reflects the British common law. 16
However, in Bunning v Cross7 a majority of the High Court made it clear
that Australian law had broken from the British law and now concerned
itself with "the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even encouragement,
being given to the unlawful conduct of [police]".' 8 This point, as the New
South Wales Law Reform Commission observed in 1979, and as is still true
10 Thus the Australian position offers some further disproof of the belief of American
conservatives, as expressed by former Chief Justice Burger that the exclusionary rule is "unique
to American jurisprudence": Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics 403 US 388, 415 (1971) per Burger CJ, dissenting. I have previously punctured
this claim in C M Bradley, "The Exclusionary Rule in Germany" (1983) 96 Harv L Rev
1032. Canada has also recently adopted a rule of evidentiary exclusion due to police misconduct.
LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5, para 210.
12 E Johnston, "The Exclusionary Rule and Other Controls Over the Abuse of Power by Police"
(1980) 54 ALl 466, 467: "[lI]t is the strong impression of this writer that over recent years
there has, at least in some jurisdictions, been a greater readiness on the part of judges to
exercise their discretion against admission".
13 The Lucas Report, supra n 6, 91.
14 The other major legal sanctions are civil suits and non-public police disciplinary procedures.
These sanctions are "notoriously least effective in the area of interrogation of suspects and
the gathering of evidence in relation to crime": E Johnston, supra n 12, 466. "The weaknesses
of these remedies . . . are such that if continued in their present form they would render
irrelevant, in terms of their practical effect [any reform of the rules of criminal procedure]":
LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5, paras 210, 258-260. The reason that internal disciplinary
procedures don't work is simple: these procedures punish bad police work. Without an
exclusionary rule, police practices that are aggressive and obtain evidence by infringing on
civil rights are not considered 'bad police work' by police review boards. Only if evidence
obtained in this way is rendered unavailable to the prosecution's case do such practices
become 'bad'. See M W Orfield, Jr, supra n 4, explaining how this works in Chicago.
15 R v Leathan (1861) 8 Cox CC 498, 501.
16 Under British common law the only discretion in the trial court to reject such evidence
would be on the ground that its use in court would be unfair (that is, prejudicial) to the
accused: Kuruma v R [1955] AC 197. See discussion in Bunning v Cross (1978-79) 141
CLR 54.
17 (1978-79) 141 CLR 54, 73 per Stephen and Aickin JJ, Barwick CJ agreeing: "[Tihe law
in Australia now differs somewhat from that in England".
18 lbid 74.
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a decade later, has not been fully grasped by the Australian legal profession
and judiciary. 19
B Mandatory Exclusion
The first basis for evidentiary exclusion is the long established common
law rule, based on concerns of reliability, that statements that have not been
voluntarily given must be suppressed. This rule was summarised in 1948
by Dixon J in McDermott v R:
If he [the accused] speaks because he is overborne his confessional statement cannot
be received in evidence and it does not matter by what means he has been overborne.
If the statement is the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or
sustained or undue insistence or pressure, it cannot be voluntary. It is also a definite
rule of the common law that a confessional statement cannot be voluntary if it
is preceded by an inducement held out by a person in authority and the inducement
has not been removed before the statement was made.
20
The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show, on the 'balance of
probability', that the statement was voluntary. 21 Despite frequent mention
of this rule in High Court decisions, it has rarely been invoked. 22 There
is no other mandatory rule of exclusion generally applicable in Australia.
In New South Wales, however, there is a statutory requirement that, in
addition to the above-stated rules, no confession may be received into evidence
if it has been induced by any "untrue representation", made to the defendant
by the authorities. 23 By contrast, a Victorian statute specifically cuts back
on the common law rule of McDermott, providing that a 'confession' should
not be inadmissible if induced by "promise or threat", "unless . . . that
19 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Working Paper Illegally and Improperly
Obtained Evidence (1979) paras 22-25. See discussion infra text at nn 117-136.
20 (1948) 76 CLR 501, 511. E Johnston, supra n 12, 466-467, adds: "It has been held that
"overborne" in the above statement means externally overborne, not overborne by internal
pressures or internal motives (for example, desire to obtain bail, not induced by anything
said by police)".
21 E Johnston, supra n 12, 467, citing dicta in Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559, 562 per
Dixon CJ; 572, per Taylor and Owen JJ.
22 See Waight and Williams, Cases and Materials on Evidence (2nd ed 1985) 735, citing two
Australian, plus a handful of other British Commonwealth cases over a period of 40 years,
as "some of the very few reported cases where a confession has been excluded because of
persistent police questioning". The Australian cases are R v Burnett (1944) VLR 115 and
R v Jones [1970] 1 NSWR 190. In Jones, where the defendant had been interrogated for
17/ hours over a period of 28 hours - including a 14 hour period of almost continuous
questioning from 7.30 pm to 9.30 am the next day - the trial judge excluded the confession,
not because it was involuntary but in the exercise of discretion. In R v Fewster (Queensland
Supreme Court, 23-26 April 1979, unreported decision of Kelly J) cited P Applegarth, "Police
Malpractice: a judicial response" in J Basten (ed) The Criminal Injustice System (1982) 277),
the defendant was hit in the mouth at time of arrest and told that "if he didn't give a
statement the police officers would come down on him as hard as possible...". The confession
was excluded.
In addition, in two Queensland cases, confessions were suppressed on the ground that
the police had offered the suspect an 'inducement' to confess. In R v Plotzki [1972] Qd
R 379 the Court of Criminal Appeals disallowed a confession made after the police suggested
that the suspect would not be charged with a crime if he confessed. In R v Beere [1965]
Qd R 370 the Queensland Supreme Court disallowed a confession simply because the police
had intimated to the suspect "that it would in some way be beneficial for her to tell the
truth": ibid 37 1. See also, Waight and Williams, ibid 736-40 discussing other Commonwealth
cases where evidence has been suppressed on this ground.
23 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 410(l)(a) and (b).
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inducement was really calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt to
be made".24 The New South Wales provision goes beyond any requirement
imposed by the United States Supreme Court. That Court has never directly
considered the issue but it did, in one case, approve on other grounds the
use of a confession that was induced by the police telling the suspect, falsely,
that his fingerprints had been found at the crime scene. 25 However, the New
South Wales courts have not ever actually excluded a confession pursuant
to this section 26 in a reported decision, and have limited it to knowingly
untrue statements by the police, made with the object of obtaining a confession
from the suspect. 27
C Discretionary Exclusion
Beyond the 'involuntariness' basis for exclusion, there are three other
possible grounds, all of which lie in the discretion of the trial judge (who
is at least obliged to consider whether that discretion should be exercised). 28
(1) Prejudicial Impact
The first of these is self evident. It is that "a confession (and indeed any
evidence tendered by the prosecution) can be rejected when its probative
value is low and its prejudicial effect is high".29 I could find no reported
instance of this discretion ever having been exercised, presumably because
the probative value of a confession is almost invariably high.
(2) Unreliability
The second ground for discretion is that a confession, though not
involuntary, may le excluded, if "it would be unfair to use it in evidence
24 Evidence Act 1958 (Vic), s 149. This provision has been read narrowly by the High Court
in R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 which held that it was strictly limited to 'confessions' rather
than other statements by the accused which might prove useful to the prosecution. And,
it is limited to cases where the "common law would have rejected the confession as non-
voluntary on the sole ground that it was induced by such a threat or promise, not to cases
in which the common law would have rejected it as non-voluntary on any other ground",
ibid 150. See also Consultative Committee on Police Powers of Investigation, Report on
s 460 of the Crimes Act of 1958 (Victoria 1986) 16.
The Australian Capital Territory has a similar provision: Evidence Act 1971, s 68(l), (2).
The other States simply use the common law voluntariness test. See P Gillies The Law
of Criminal Investigation (1982) 92-97.
25 Oregon v Mathiason 429 US 492, 495 (1977).
26 All of the New South Wales cases interpreting this section seem to have found the evidence
admissible, eg because a false statement was not made for the purpose of obtaining a statement
from an accused: R v Thompson (1961) 62 SR(NSW) 135; or because the false statement
was made by an agent provocateur for the purpose of inducing the defendant to commit
an offence rather than confessing to a previously committed offence: Feiler v McIntyre [1974]
2 NSWLR 268. See generally, Waight and Williams, supra n 22, 742.
27 R v Thompson, supra n 26.
28 R v Ireland, (1971-72) 126 CLR 321, 335 per Barwick CJ.
29 Waight and Williams, supra n 22, 750. See eg Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517, 541 per
Gibbs J, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ agreeing; R v Gidley (1984) 3 NSWLR 168; 172-
73 per Hunt J; R v Tetlow (1986) 27 A Crim R 198, 200 per Burt CJ. (None of these
cases involved the actual exclusion of confessional evidence on prejudice grounds; they simply
stated the principle that it could be done.)
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against [the defendant]". 30 There had been considerable confusion about
whether this 'unfairness' referred to misconduct by the police or concerned
the unreliability of the statement. 3' Recently, however, a majority of the High
Court made it clear that the latter circumstance was what concerned the
Court:
Unfairness, in this sense, is concerned with the accused's right to a fair trial a
right which may be jeopardised if a statement is obtained in circumstances which
affect the reliability of the statement (emphasis added). 32
Thus the Court has implicitly endorsed the earlier statement of Latham CJ
that "examples of such unfairness would be afforded by irresponsibility by
the accused on the occasion when the statement was made or failure on
his part to understand and appreciate the effect of question and answers."33
This head of discretion would not apply to the finding of real evidence which
could not be rendered unreliable by the means by which it was obtained. 34
While court opinions refer to this discretion with relative frequency, 35 I was
however able to discover only two cases, both of lower courts, in which
it was actually exercised.
In Klemenko v Huffa36 a single judge of the South Australian Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction for a summary offence of being
in possession of stolen property on the ground that psychiatric testimony
showed that he was insane at the time he gave his statement to the police
and the magistrate had not considered whether or not to exercise his
discretion. 37 In a study of all indictable cases that were concluded in the
Sydney District Courts in a six week period there was, among the 147 cases,
one (unreported) in which the judge excluded the confession of a defendant,
30 McDermott v R (1947-48) 76 CLR 501, 506-7 per Latham CJ, 517 per Williams J; R v
Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133, 154-55 (unanimous judgment).
31 P Gillies, supra n 24, 101: "[I]t will be apparent that an element of ambiguity has been
introduced into this branch of the law." See discussion at 102-104.
32 Van der Meer v R (1988) 82 ALR 10, 26 per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
33 McDermott v R supra n 30, 507. See also Ostojic v R (1978) 18 SASR 188, 197 per Wells
J, (Hogarth and King JJ agreeing): ". . . I can imagine cases in which a trial judge might
exercise this discretionary power where no [police] impropriety existed. A suspect might
be suffering hidden but naturally occurring pain, [or] he might have sustained severe shock
...". (But his Honour was less inclined to find that self-induced drunkeness might lead
to an exercise of the discretion: id.).
In Duke v R (1989) 83 ALR 650, Brennan J further elaborated on his view of the 'unfairness'
discretion: "The unfairness against which an exercise of the discretion is intended to protect
an accused may arise not only because the conduct of the preceding investigation has produced
a confession which is unreliable but because no confession might have been made if the
investigation had been properly conducted. If, by reason of the manner of the investigation,
it is unfair to admit evidence of the confession, whether because the reliability of the confession
has been made suspect or for any other reason, that evidence should be excluded. Trickery,
misrepresentation, omission to inquire into material facts lest they be exculpatory, cross-
examination going beyond the clarification of information voluntarily given, or detaining
a suspect or keeping him in isolation without lawful justification - to name but some
improprieties - may justify rejection of evidence of a confession if the impropriety had
some material effect on the confessionalist" (at 653). In my view, this statement is not helpful
as it tends to confuse the 'unfairness' (unreliability) head of discretion with the 'police
misconduct' head of discretion, discussed infra text at nn 30-31.
34 But see discussion of the third head of discretion, infra text at nn 48-107.
35 See, generally, P Gillies, supra n 24, 98-127 and cases discussed therein; Waight and Williams
supra n 22, 771-73.
36 (1978) 17 SASR 549.
37 Ibid 557.
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heroin addict, who was "physically debilitated and under heavy medication"
and exhibited a "very markedly clouded consciousness". 38
Contrariwise, in several cases, the courts, including the High Court, upheld
the admission of a confession where it would have seemed that it should
have been excluded due to the defendant's incapacity. In Basto v R39 the
confession was admitted despite the fact that the defendant was suffering
from an overdose of drugs (which he had taken for the purpose of committing
suicide) and later the same day was deemed to be insane. In R v Starecki o
the defendant's statement had been taken after he had shot himself in the
brain.
The American approach to the mentally unbalanced confessor has a different
focus but will usually not allow use of the confession of an insane person.
In Colorado v Connelly4I ' the defendant had approached a policeman on
the street and confessed to a murder. A psychiatrist testified that this confession
was motivated by psychosis. 42 The United States Supreme Court, reversing
the Colorado Supreme Court, held that the confession was not excludable
on Fifth Amendment 43 grounds because the Fifth Amendment only prohibited
"police wrongdoing" which was obviously not present in this case.44 That
is, there was, in no sense, 'compelled self-incrimination', as forbidden by
the Constitution.
The Supreme Court thus distinguished an earlier case, Blackburn v
Alabama,45 where the police had intensively interrogated an insane person
to extract a confession. In Blackburn the Court ordered the confession
excluded. Connelly did not present the issue of reliability because, having
excluded the confession as 'involuntary', the trial court had made no finding
as to reliability.46 The Supreme Court indicated that such inquiries should
be left to State law.4 7 Under the laws of most States, a confession by an
insane person would not be considered reliable and consequently could not
be used.48
38 N Stevenson, "Criminal Cases in the NSW District Court: a pilot study" in J Basten (ed)
supra n 22, 106, 115.
39 (1954) 91 CLR 628. See also Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 where the confession was
admitted despite the fact that the defendant was considered insane.
40 [1960] VR 141. See also R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 (defendant suffering obvious head injuries
sustained in automobile accident) and other cases cited in Waight and Williams, supra n
22, 773.
41 55 USLW 4043 (1986).
42 Ibid 4044.
43 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, "nor
shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself".
44 Supra n 41, 4045.
45 361 US 199 (1960). The Court also distinguished Townsend v Sain 372 US 293 (1963) where
the confession was excluded because police had injected a suspect with a 'truth serum'.
46 Supra n 41, 4050 per Brennan J, dissenting.
47 Supra n 41, 4046. The Court went on to hold, wrongly in my view, that the defendant
was capable of making a voluntary waiver of his right to silence and could be interrogated
further by the police after receipt of Miranda warnings. This flies in the face of the Blackburn
holding that "a most basic sense of justice is affronted by ... incarcerating a human being
on the basis of a statement he made while insane": supra n 45, 207 (at least where, as
in Blackburn, he is questioned while insane).
48 See eg, Wharton's Criminal Evidence (4th ed 1986) 643: "A confession is inadmissible if
the accused was mentally or physically incapacitated at the time." (However, mental retardation,
as opposed to insanity, does not automatically bar a confession but is a factor to be considered
in its admissibility.)
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(3) Police Misconduct
The final basis for discretionary exclusion of evidence in Australia is "when
the evidence is the product of unfair or unlawful conduct on the part of
the police". 49 However, unlike in America, where the mere failure to give
the Miranda warnings or to obtain a search warrant when appropriate will
automatically result in evidentiary exclusion,5 0 in Australia the trial judge
must weigh two competing requirements against each other: ". . . the desirable
goal of bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of
curial approval, or even encouragement, being given to the unlawful conduct
of those whose task it is to enforce the law." 5' In R v Ireland52 the High
Court held that photographs of the defendant's hands, taken without consent,
to allow an expert witness to evaluate whether scratches on the hand were
caused by the handling of a knife with a damaged handle, should have been
excluded from the defendant's murder trial. In Ireland the policeman told
the suspect that he "had to" have his hands photographed. 53 The court held
that neither at common law nor under the relevant statutes' has a police
officer power to require a person to submit himself to photography for any
purpose other than identification,55 and that the photographs should have
been excluded in the exercise of the trial court's discretion.5 6
As the High Court later made clear in Bunning v Cross,57 this head of
discretion
by no means takes as its central point the question of unfairness to the accused.
It is, on the contrary, concerned with broader questions of high public policy,
unfairness to the accused being only one factor which, if present, will play its
part in the whole process of consideration. 58
These factors include regard for the "liberty of the subject"59 and concern
that the government not "'play an ignoble part' ' 6" in the conviction of
criminals. Thus, the concerns of respect for privacy, concern for the purity
49 Cleland v R (1982-83) 151 CLR 1,7 per Gibbs, CJ quoting Bunning v Cross (1978-79) 141
CLR 54, 74-75 per Stephen and Aickin JJ; Barwick, CJ agreeing. "[the] principal area of
operation [of this head of discretion] will be in relation to what might loosely be called
'real evidence', such as articles found by illegal search, recordings of conversations, the result
of breathalyser tests, fingerprint evidence and so on."
50 Eg Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 444 (1966): "The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless [he has received the warnings]".
51 Bunning v Cross (1978-79) 141 CLR 54, 74 per Stephen and Aickin JJ; cited in Cleland
v R (1982-83) 151 CLR I, 7per Gibbs CJ.
52 (1971-72) 126 CLR 321.
53 Ibid 327.
54 Police Offences Act 1953 (SA), s 81.
55 Supra n 28, 334, per Barwick CJ, (McTiernan, Windeyer, Owen and Walsh JJ agreeing).
56 Ibid 335.
57 (1978-79) 141 CLR 54.
58 Ibid 74-75 per Stephen and Aickin JJ.
59 Ibid 78 per Stephen and Aickin JJ.
60 Id quoting Olmstead v United States 277 US 438, 470 (1928) per Holmes J, dissenting.
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of the judicial process and deterrence of police misconduct all figure in the
Australian, as they do in the American, exclusionary rule. 61
More specifically, the factors to consider include whether the "unlawful
or improper conduct"62 on the part of the police was intentional or reckless
on the one hand or merely "accidental" or "unconscious" on the other;63
"the ease with which the law might have been complied with";64 the nature
of the offence charged 65 and whether there is evidence that the rule broken
was one which reflected a "deliberate intent on the part of the legislature
to narrowly restrict the police .. .".66 The probative value of the evidence
would be a factor to consider only in cases of a negligent police violation. 67
In Bunning, by a 4 to I majority, the High Court reversed the magistrate's
exercise of discretion and held that evidence of a breathalyser test would
be admissible in a drunk driving case despite the fact that it had been taken
without reasonable suspicion and without performing a preliminary roadside
test as required by the statute.68 In R v Williams the High Court upheld
the trial judge's exercise of discretion in excluding the confession of a burglary
suspect who had been arrested at 6.00 am on one day and not taken to
the magistrate until 10.00 am the following day. "If an arrested person is
detained, not for the purpose of enabling him to be brought before a justice,
but for the purpose of questioning him, the detention will be unlawful."69
However, the Court did not hold that evidence must be excluded in such
circumstances; it simply declined to consider whether the trial judge had
inappropriately exercised his discretion in excluding the evidence. 70
Both of these cases go beyond the constitutional requirements of fair
procedure in the United States. It is quite clear there since Schmerber v
California7' that the accused can be subjected to photographing, fingerprinting
61 Compare Weeks v United States 232 US 383 (1914) (original case declaring exclusionary
rule in Federal Courts) with United States v Calandra 414 US 338 (1974) (assuming that
deterrence of police misconduct is goal of American exclusionary rule). See S J Wasserstrom,
"The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment" (1984) 21 Am Crim L Rev 257 disputing
the Court's current view.
62 Bunning v Cross (1978-79) 141 CLR 54, 74-75 per Stephen and Aickin JJ.
63 Ibid 77 per Stephen and Aickin JJ.
64 Id.
65 Ibid 79 per Stephen and Aickin JJ.
66 Id.
67 Ibid 77 per Stephen and Aickin JJ. That is, if the police misconduct were intentional, the
fact that the evidence was very significant to the prosecution's case would be irrelevant.
68 Ibid 71 per Stephen and Aickin JJ.
69 (1986) 161 CLR 278, 285 per Gibbs CJ.
70 Ibid 285 per Gibbs, CJ; 302 per Mason and Brennan JJ (because this was a question of
mixed law and fact, not open to the prosecution to appeal after an acquittal). This explains
the seeming inconsistency with Cleland (1982-83) 151 CLR 1, where the court upheld the
admission of a confession of a defendant (though reversing the conviction on other grounds)
who was arrested at 1.00 pm and held until midnight, despite the trial judge's holding that
it was unlawful to hold the defendant in custody after 5.30 pm without taking him before
a magistrate. See also R v Salihos (1987) 27 A Crim R 319, upholding the admission of
a confession obtained during a concededly illegal (because too extended) custody following
a legal arrest on the ground that the police misconduct did not demonstrate a deliberate
or reckless disregard of the law. The court noted that Williams did not require exclusion.
In R v Narula (1986) 22 A Crim R 409 a confession obtained during an illegal delay was
not excluded because the police were unaware of a pre-Williams Federal Court decision
forbidding postponing taking the defendant before a justice until after the first interrogation.
71 384 US 757 (1966).
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and the taking of blood, hair, urine, voice,7 2 and handwriting samples for
the purpose of using the evidence thus discovered against him.7 3 The Ireland
decision seems strange, in view of the general reluctance of the Australian
courts to exclude evidence. Given the experience of the ensuing nineteen
years, it must be regarded as an aberration on its facts. 74 However, its basic
recognition of the discretion to exclude real evidence due to police misconduct
continues to be the law. 75
Similarly to Williams, the United States Supreme Court has, in Mallory
v United States,76 struck down a conviction on the ground that a seven hour
delay (which resulted in a confession) in taking the defendant before a
magistrate violated the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure requiring such
an appearance without "unnecessary delay".77 However, this decision has never
been applied to the states through the Constitution and has been 'reversed'
by Congress. 78
Unlike the Australian 'rules' of exclusion discussed earlier, the 'police
misconduct' discretion is actually used from time to time, at least in confession
cases, though not with any regularity or consistent logic. For example, the
South Australian Supreme Court has been quite firm in enforcing an
apparently "automatic discretionary exclusion "79 where the police continue
to question the defendant after he has asserted either his right to silence
or to counsel. 80 Queensland has a similar, though clearly not 'automatic'
rule, 81 at least as to assertion of the right to counsel. However, as one
commentator has observed, "in the reported cases where (confessional]
evidence was not admitted, there was evidence which strongly corroborated
the accused's story". 82 Thus these confessions may actually have been ordered
excluded, not because of procedural irregularities, but because the courts
believed that they were fabricated.
72 United States v Dionisio 410 US 1, 5-7 (1973).
73 United States v Wade 388 US 218, 223 (1967): "[The Fifth Amendment] offers no protection
against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or measurements, to write or
speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk or to
make a particular gesture."
74 Most Australian state statutes provide for bodily examinations of persons in custody including
the taking of blood and hair samples, so the issue is not likely to arise very often. See
generally, P Gillies, supra n 24, 260-61. See too Ex parte Weldon (1971) 2 NSWLR 294
excluding breathalyser evidence obtained in violation of statute.
15 Cleland(1982-83) 151 CLR 1, 19-20 per Deane J.
76 354 US 449, 455 (1957).
77 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 5(a).
78 In 1968 Congress provided that such a delay alone would not be a basis for evidentiary
exclusion but only a factor to consider in determining 'voluntariness': 18 USC 3501 (1968).
(Congress could only do this because Mallory was grounded on the Congressionally enacted
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, not on the Constitution.)
79 This oxymoronic characterisation is from Waight and Williams, supra n 22 768.
80 R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392, 398-99 per Bray CJ; R v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321;
Walker v Marklew (1976) 14 SASR 463; R v Buckskin (1974) 10 SASR 1, 5 per Walters
J.
81 R v Hart (1979) Qd R 8, 13 per Connolly J: "The circumstance that an accused person
has been refused access to his solicitor will not render evidence of his subsequent interrogation
legally inadmissible but it may well be a ground for the exercise of the discretion to reject
his confession". The Court qualified this right of access to the solicitor to cases where "no
unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the process of investigation . . . ." id. See also
R v Borsellino [1978] Qd R 507, 513 per Dunn J.
82 N Stevenson, supra n 38, 120.
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The High Court, while recognising the "clearly established judicial
discretion" 83 to exclude evidence in such a case, has indicated that such
exclusion is not mandatory. 84 In New South Wales, in the extraordinary
case of R v Merritt and Roso85 a confession was admitted into evidence
despite the fact that the accused had given the police a written declaration,
drawn up by his solicitor, stating that he would only answer questions in
the presence of a lawyer. The court upheld the trial judge's admission of
the confession on the ground that the defendant had failed to prove that
his written declaration had come to the attention of the interviewing (as
opposed to the arresting) officers. 86 The police claimed that it had not.87
Defendant's further claim that after being cautioned and asked if he understood
the caution he replied "No, and you can tell him [another officer] to stop
writing", was also rejected on the ground that it was equivocal. 88
In America, the law on this issue is fairly clear. As is well known, before
a defendant can be subjected to 'custodial interrogation' by the police he
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says
may be used against him, that he has a right to counsel, and that if he
can't afford counsel, one will be provided free of charge. 89 If the defendant
indicates that he wishes to remain silent, questioning must cease. 90 If he
indicates that he wants a lawyer, questioning must cease until a lawyer is
83 Ireland supra n 28 333 per Barwick CJ.
84 Id. In Ireland, the Court cited Basto v R (1954) 91 CLR 628, where it had approved the
admission of such a statement in the discretion of the trial judge. See also R v Lee (1950)
82 CLR 133, 157.
85 (1985) 19 A Crim R 360.
86 lbid 375 per Hunt J.
87 lbid 372 per Hunt J. The court suggested that, even if this declaration had come to the
attention of the interviewing officers it might not be relevant: ibid 375.
88 Ibid 376 per Hunt J. The defendant further claimed that his confession had been fabricated
by the police: ibid 372. This allegation is frequently made in Australia, apparently with
substantial basis. See discussion, infra text at nn 85-88; also, R v Dugan (1970) 92 WN(NSW)
767 where the accused had been refused access to his solicitor who was elsewhere on the
premises, but the evidence was admitted despite two judges deeming the police conduct
"reprehensible"; and R v Barron [1975] VR 496, 504 per Young CJ and Menhennitt J
(defendant stated that he didn't want to answer questions; record of interview nevertheless
admissible).
89 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966).
90 lbid 474. There is an exception to this principle recognised in Michigan v Mosley 423 US
96 (1975) where the defendant, after being properly warned and questioned about Crime
A, indicated that he didn't want to discuss it. Two hours later, a different detective, after
warning the defendant, questioned him about Crime B. The defendant did not indicate that
he wished to remain silent as to Crime B, and confessed. It is unclear whether Mosley
is only applicable when two different crimes and two sets of police are involved or whether
it would also apply to a resumption of questioning of a defendant by the same police as
to the same crime. It is my impression that this issue doesn't often arise. That is, that the
police and/or lower courts generally respect the defendant's assertion of the right to silence.
See, eg Anderson v Smith 751 F 2d 96, 101 (1984); Robinson v Percy 738 F 2d 214, 220
(1984). (Both cases holding that subsequent questioning after an invocation of the right to
silence was error and the defendant's responses should not have been admitted into evidence.
Anderson's conviction was reversed but Robinson's was affirmed on the ground that the
error was harmless.)
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provided.9' Any statements made by the defendant after invocation of these
rights (or if the warnings have not been given) must be excluded from
evidence. 92 The fact that one policeman did not know that the defendant
had asserted his rights to another policeman is irrelevant. 93
In addition to the 'assertion of rights' cases, the problem of holding
defendants for the purpose of interrogation has attracted judicial attention
in Australia. As discussed, in Williams 94 the High Court affirmed a trial
court ruling that a confession should be excluded when obtained during an
unnecessary delay in bringing the accused before a magistrate, enforcing a
Tasmanian statute which reflected the common law requirement of such an
appearance "as soon as practicable". 95 To the same effect was an earlier,
unanimous, decision based on a Commonwealth statute, R v Iorlano.96 A
series of Victorian cases had similarly excluded confessional evidence based
on s 460 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) which required that arrestees be brought
before a magistrate "as soon as practicable." 97 This led the Victorian Parliament
to amend s 460 to provide that the police could hold a suspect for up to
six hours, rather than presenting him "as soon as practicable" before the
magistrate; 98 but recently, the statute has been changed again allowing the
police to hold the defendant for a "reasonable time" before presenting him. 99
By the same token, some, but not all, Australian courts have held that
the discretion to exclude evidence should be exercised when a confession
is obtained from a defendant who is in illegal custody ab initio.00 It would
seem to follow from Williams that if unduly extended custody should be
91 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 474 (1966) and Edwards v Arizona 451 US 477 (1981).
There is no exception similar to Mosley when the defendant has invoked his right to counsel.
Arizona v Roberson 56 USLW 4590 (1988). However, if, after invocation of his right to
counsel, the defendant 'initiates' further discussions with the police, his statements may
be used against him: Oregon v Bradshaw 462 US 1039, 1044 (1983). The reason that the
Court has given for treating the invocation of the rights to silence and counsel differently is
that, in the latter case, the subject, by asking for counsel, is indicating that he can't deal
with interrogation without assistance. In the former case, he is showing that he is in command
of the situation and consequently is capable of making a reasoned decision whether to
speak or remain silent in the face of subsequent questioning. Y Kamisar, "The Edwards
and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and The Court Taketh Away" (1984) 5 Supreme
Court: Trends and Developments 1982-83 153, argues that this distinction is untenable.
92 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 476 (1966).
93 Arizona v Roberson 56 USLW 4590, 4593 (1988) per Stevens J.
94 (1986) 161 CLR 278.
95 lbid 285 per Gibbs CJ.
96 (1983) 50 ALR 291. lorlano interpreted the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) which provided that
an arrested person should be brought before the magistrate "without undue delay".
97 Eg R v Carter (Vic County Court, 1983, unreported decision of Just J), R v Stewart and
Kent (Vic County Court, 1983, unreported decision of Just J), noted in Consultative Commit-
tee on Police Powers of Investigation, Report on s 460 of the Crimes Act of 1958 (Victoria
1986) 21; R v Larson and Lee [1984] VR 559, 569 per Hampel J: "The conduct of the
police demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the rights of the accused." Larson also involved
a written statement from a solicitor that the accused had nothing to say to the police.
98 Crimes (Criminal Investigations) Act 1984 (Vie) s 460(3), (7), (10) allowed the police to
apply to a judge for an additional six hour period, but only with the consent of the accused.
99 Crimes (Custody and Investigation) Act 1988) (Vic), s 464A. Whether the courts will deem
"a reasonable time" to give the police more leeway than "as soon as practicable" remains
to be seen.
100 Compare R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392 (Full Court) and Walker v Marklew (1976)
14 SASR 463, 467 per Bray CJ, 475 per Jacobs J, 482 per King J (excluding the confession,
in part, due to an illegal arrest), with R v Banner [1970] VR 240, 249 (Full Court) and
R v Lavery (No.2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 (admitting the confession).
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the grounds for exclusion of a confession, then so should custody that was
illegal at its inception.' 0'
Beyond these cases, Australian law exhibits only sporadic examples of
evidentiary exclusion, usually by single state Supreme Court trial justices
that can, in no sense, be considered to state a 'rule' that is generally applied
by the courts of that state, much less the country. For example, in
R v Soundry0 2 the judge excluded a confession where the police had given
"deliberately false answers" to solicitors who called the police to locate an
accused. And, in the unusual case of R v Amad'0 3 a confession was excluded
on the ground that it was obtained by a mild 'cross-examination' of a suspect
in custody. 0 4
By contrast, there are numerous cases where the courts have refused to
exclude evidence despite rather extreme examples of police misconduct. The
most important of these is the recent High Court case of Van der Meer v R.05
In Van der Meer the five Justices who decided the case unanimously
condemned the police interrogation techniques, the majority describing them
"rather bizarre"'1 6 (though never flatly terming them illegal). Yet, by a 3
to 2 majority the court held that the trial judge had not misapplied the
principles relevant to determine whether to exclude the suspects' admissions. 07
The disapproved procedures included confronting a suspect with the victims,
and noting his responses to their accusations, the effect of which was "virtually
to put [the suspect] on trial" at the police station. 08 Also, the police, during
an interrogation that began about 10.00 am and continued sporadically until
about midnight, engaged in conduct which Mason CJ described as "persistent
confrontation of each [suspect] with the alleged statements of the other
[suspects] in an endeavour to break down his denial of guilt and the absence
of any caution to [two suspects] until late in the interrogation".' °9 The majority
101 In America, exclusion in such a case is mandatory, Brown v Illinois 422 US 590, 603
(1975) unless intervening factors, such as release from custody or consultation with a lawyer,
have broken the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession. Miranda
warnings alone will not do this: Dunaway v New York 442 US 200 (1979).
102 Queensland Supreme Court, 26 March 1980, unreported decision of Macrossan J cited in
J Basten (ed), supra n 22, 277. This would not be grounds for suppression in America.
In Moran v Burbine 475 US 412 (1986) the police had told the defendant's lawyer that
they would not be questioning him that night. They did question him and he confessed.
The Court, while indicating its "distaste for the deliberate misleading of an officer of the
Court", held that "nothing in the Constitution vests in us the authority to mandate a code
of behaviour for state officials" and that this behaviour in no way amounted to compulsory
self-incrimination.
103 [1962] VR 545.
104 Cf R v Von Aspern [1964] VR 91, 93 per O'Bryan J taking a broader view of police powers
to interrogate. As the High Court put it in R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133, 155:
[A]n invitation to explain established facts can hardly be called cross-examination in
any relevant sense. It is cross-examination in the sense of breaking down the will and
extorting admissions by persons who are being questioned by the police that is to be
reprehended.
Anad must be regarded as an aberration.
105 (1988) 82 ALR 10.
106 Ibid 25 per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ.
107 Ibid 28-29.
108 Ibid 25.
109 ibid 17. This latter factor was not condemned by the majority which held that the caution
is not required until the police are "satisfied that [they have] a case against [a suspect]":
ibid 25.
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further brushed off the fact that, when one of the suspects [Ayliffe] finally
was cautioned and asked if he was prepared to answer further questions
he replied "No, not really", and "I'm not saying nothing". Despite this, he
was encouraged to, and did, respond to what the police told him his fellow
suspects had said."10 Oddly, none of the opinions discussed the Ireland
(deterrence of police misconduct) discretion. The majority confined itself to
the reliability issue and, concluding that the statements were reliable, admitted
them."'
In R v Banner" 2 a suspect was arrested without reasonable suspicion, held
incommunicado and interrogated by the police over a period of three days
without being taken before a magistrate. The Victorian Supreme Court, while
strongly condemning the police behaviour and declaring them "guilty ...
of unlawful acts" and "possibly criminal conduct"" 3 nevertheless admitted
his confession to murder into evidence." 14
In R v S and J115 the statutory requirement that arrestees be brought
"forthwith" before a magistrate was avoided by the simple expedient of not
formally arresting the sixteen year-old Aboriginal suspects until after "many
hours" of interrogation. 116 The two suspects were taken separately to police
headquarters and, though they were told they were "not under arrest", the
police admitted that they would have arrested them had the suspects not
110 Ibid 18 per Mason CJ; 31 per Deane J. Justice Deane described this case as "an example
of how police investigations should not be conducted in this country."
Eg, ibid 26 per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ: "[T]he question is not whether the police
have acted unfairly; the question is whether it would be unfair to the accused to use his
statement against him. [That is, was that] statement obtained in circumstances which affect
[its] reliability...". This failure to discuss the Ireland discretion in Van der Meer suggests
ambivalence on the part of the High Court as to what its stance should be toward excluding
evidence to deter police misconduct. One possible explanation for this failure could be
that the court, apparently, found no statutory violation by the police and hence their conduct
was not technically 'unlawful'. However, in Bunning v Cross (1978-79) 141 CLR 54, 71
per Stephen and Aickin JJ made it clear that this head of discretion applied to both 'unlawful
or improper conduct' by police. Certainly it would make no sense to exclude evidence
to deter the mild violation of telling a suspect that he had to have his hands photographed
but not to exclude it in a case of police brutality simply because there was no statute
explicitly forbidding this.
112 [1970] VR 240 (Full Court).
113 Ibid 249. The court noted that, during the first 15 hours of detention, before the suspect
gave his first confession, the police did not even have reasonable grounds for suspecting
him of any crime, or that a crime had even been committed.
114 Ibid 251-252. The court, as in Van der Meer, held that it was not 'unfair' to use the confession.
However, this case was decided before Ireland, where the 'deterrence of police misconduct'
head of discretion was established. See R v Larson and Lee [1984] VR 559, a more recent
Victorian case excluding evidence in a case of similar, though less serious police misconduct.
115 (1983) 8 A Crim R 88.
116 lbid 96 per White J, dissenting.
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agreed to go to the police station and "the suspects believed that that would
be the result of non-compliance"."17
(4) No Exclusion due to Illegal Searches
While the Australian law as to exclusion of confessions on any of the
grounds set forth by the High Court can charitably be described as erratic,
it is at least apparent that courts are alive to the possibility that they can,
through enforcement of exclusionary principles, put pressure on the police
to follow the rules, if only there were more clearcut 'rules' to follow. In
contrast to this is the total failure of Australian courts ever to exclude the
fruits of an illegal search from evidence in a criminal trial. 18 Every state
has statutory rules governing searches" 9 that are similar to the American
rules and in numerous cases the courts have struck down warrants and ordered
the evidence returned due to failure to set forth reasonable grounds in the
application, and for overbreadth, etc. 20 However, these decisions do not
necessarily preclude the police from proceeding with a prosecution and re-
117 Ibid 94 per Mitchell J. The police also failed to have a parent,. guardian or representative
of the Aboriginal Rights Movement present at the interrogation as required by police
instructions: ibid 91. Contra, R v W and others [1988] 2 Qd R 308 where, on virtually
identical facts, a Queensland trial judge excluded confessions of Aboriginal juveniles as
both involuntary and unfair.
In R v Byczko and McCloud (1982) 30 SASR 578 the fact that the defendants were
"detained without lawful authority" and believed that they were not free to go (one even
had his overalls taken away by the police) was not sufficient to require exclusion of a
confession: ibid 584. This, despite the court's conclusion that "the infringement of the
appellant's legal rights was undoubtedly serious": ibid 585. To the same effect is R v Narula
(1986) 22 A Crim R 409: illegal delay in arraignment - no exclusion of confession.
118 "[A]s far as I am aware there has not been any significant or reported case in which evidence
has been excluded because of the illegality of the means of its production." (Letter to author
from Prof Peter Sallmann, 18 May 1989.) See eg Gillies, supra n 24, 241. Gillies cites
three Australian cases in support of the proposition that "when real evidence has been
improperly or unlawfully obtained . . . the trial judge [may] exercise his discretion to reject
it". In all three cases, the evidence was, in fact, admitted. McIntyre v Sing (1979) 30 ALR
299; Crowley v Murphy (1979) 28 ACTR 1; Trimboli v Onley (1981) 37 ALR 38. Ireland
and Ex p Weldon (1971) 2 NSWLR 294, involving illegal seizures, but not searches, are
the only cases I discovered involving exclusion of real evidence on any ground. Even evidence
obtained by an illegal wiretap is admissible in cases punishable by more than three years
imprisonment: P Gillies, ibid 289-290, citing the Telecommunications Act 1975 (Cth) s 7.
However, the High Court has held that documents which would not be admissible in Court
anyway, due to legal professional privilege, may not be seized pursuant to a search warrant:
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Arno v Forsyth (1986) 65 ALR 125 (Full Federal
Court).
119 Eg the Crimes Act (1900) (NSW), s 357E provides for the stop and search of persons
or vehicles reasonably suspected of "having or conveying any thing stolen or otherwise
unlawfully obtained or any thing used or intended to be used in the commission of an
indictable offence". The Search Warrant Act 1985 (NSW), ss 5 and 6 provides that search
warrants may be issued on reasonable grounds for belief that there is, on any premises,
"a thing connected with a particular [specified] offence" and that the warrant must specify
the things to be searched. It further provides for the seizure of other evidence found on
the premises (s 7), the search, on reasonable suspicion, of people found on the premises
(s 8) and for telephonic warrants "in case of urgent need" (s 12).
120 R v Optical Prescription Spectacle Makers Pty Ltd (1986-87) 25 A Crim R 143 (Fed Ct
of Aust); Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334 (Fed Ct of Aust - Full Court); Hedges
v Grundman (1985) 19 A Crim R 303 (Sup Court of Qld - Full Court); Tran Nominees
Pty Ltd v Scheffler (1985) 20 A Crim R 287 (Sup Court of SA).
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obtaining the same evidence by subpoena.' 2' Moreover, all of these decisions
are in warrant cases where the police are already making an effort to comply
with the law. More in need of scrutiny are warrantless searches and seizures,
but these appear to have largely escaped judicial notice. In one of the rare
cases where this issue has been considered, in R v Tilev, 122 the police entered
a flat without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion and found significant
evidence of a murder. The trial judge, while recognising his discretion to
exclude the evidence under Bunning v Cross, refused to do so on the ground
that the police conduct, while illegal, was not "wholly outrageous". 23 Thus,
despite the pronouncements of the High Court in Bunning v Cross, Australian
courts still seem to reflect the British view that "the interests of the state
must excuse the seizure of documents, which seizure would otherwise be
unlawful, if it appears in fact that such documents were evidence of a crime
committed by anyone". 24 Discussions with Australian defence attorneys who
were keenly aware of police violations in the confessions area did not reveal
much concern about illegal searches. 25 In part this could be explained by
the high proportion of cases in which there is a confession - 96 per cent
in one study. 26 If the police can get a confession they will not feel as much
need to search. Another explanation lies in the finding of the Law Reform
Commission that "very many of the searches of premises undertaken by police
officers are made ... at the 'invitation' or at least the consent of the
occupier". 27 Still, given the large number of cases involving suppression of
illegally seized evidence in America, despite the presence of a consent doctrine
there as well, 28 it is inconceivable that there are not a significant number
of cases involving evidentiary seizures by Australian police where the propriety
121 In fact in Hedges, supra n 120, the court ordered the return only of private medical files
seized by the police that had no relevance to a criminal case. The court explicitly did "not
extend the order to other property seized at the time of the execution of the warrants
in view of the pending criminal proceedings": ibid 304per Campbell J, Connelly J concurring.
This, despite the court's finding that the warrants in question were "bad on their face":
ibid 303.
122 (1984) 33 SASR 344.
123 Ibid 352 per Wells J. See also Milner v Anderson (1982) 42 ACTR 23 (evidence of a
search of defendant's person admitted despite the lack of a reasonable suspicion or consent).
124 J Oxley-Oxland, NSW Police Law Handbook (1988) s 1806 quoting Elias v Passmore (1934)
2 KB 164. Oxley-Oxland opines, however, that if the police conduct were "oppressive ...
it would not be right to allow the Crown to rely upon it."
125 Eg interview with public defender, 13 February 1989; interview with barrister, 23 February
1989.
126 N Stevenson, supra n 22, 108-109. This figure apparently was a percentage only of cases
which resulted in conviction, whether by guilty plea or trial, and did not include dismissals
and/or acquittal.
127 LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5 para 195. One study showed that, in a 6 month
period in 1975, 62% of the searches conducted by the (former) Narcotics Bureau and Customs
Department were made by consent. The Commission recommended that a signed
acknowledgement should be produced by police claiming consent "the absence of such
acknowledgement being prima facie evidence" that the search was not consented to: ibid
para 197. Obviously, it is believed by the Commission that the police are as willing to
fabricate consents to search as they are confessions. In my study in America, I found that
consents were advanced as a justification for the search in 17% (37 of 223) of the appellate
case studied: C M Bradley, "Are the State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment?"
(1989) 77 Georgetown Law Jo 501, 508.
128 Schneckloth v Bustamonte 412 US 218, 223 (1973) (defendant need not be informed of
his right to withhold consent). Nor need the consent be written.
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of the search (or the existence or voluntariness of the consent) should at
least be discussed.
This impression is confirmed by two cases where the court's description
of the police behaviour seemed to involve an illegal search, even though
that issue was not discussed. In R v Narula129 the court, in discussing whether
a confession was admissible, mentions that the heroin was located by the
police during a "surreptitious search" of a hotel room. Since no search warrant
is mentioned, I presume this was the result of an illegal entry. 30 In another
case, R v Kushkarian,'31 the appellant was arrested for possession of a sawed-
off shotgun (and later charged and convicted of armed robbery) after the
shotgun "was found [by police] in the back of his motor vehicle".13 2 There
is no discussion of how the police came to look in the back of his vehicle,
which was parked at his home.
A particularly striking example of both the relative rarity of, but also
the lack of concern in the Australian legal system for illegal searches is provided
by the Beach Report. 33 There, twenty cases of gross violations of individual
rights by the Melbourne police are set forth including false arrests, fabricated
confessions and brutalising of arrestees. 134 Only one of these cases involved
a search at all. 35 In that case the police, acting with reasonable suspicion
but without a search warrant or in exigent circumstances, broke into a flat
occupied by two suspects, pushed one of them out of a window to the street
30 feet below and brutalised him as he lay on the ground with broken limbs.
Yet despite the obvious illegality of this search, the Board of Inquiry makes
no mention of the fact that no warrant was obtained, but focuses instead
on the subsequent police brutality. While this brutality was certainly the
most important feature of the incident, it is still inconceivable that an American
analysis of a similar incident would not point out, as a matter of first principle,
the illegality of the warrantless entry.
3 PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
As the cases discussed illustrate, and as Australians who have studied the
system agree, "the 'law' of criminal investigation in Australia is in a totally
unsatisfactory state." 36 Despite this recognition, however, neither of the two
major models of reform, the Law Reform Commission reports on Criminal
Investigation (1975) and Evidence (1987), recommends the adoption of the
129 (1986) 22 A Crim R 409.
130 In America, at least, hotel employees may not consent to the search of a particular room
during the period in which it has been rented by a guest. Stoner v California 376 US
483 (1969). It is not clear what the Australian rule is, or whether any such consent was
obtained in this case.
'31 (1984-85) 16 A Crim R 416.
132 Ibid 417 per Street CJ.
133 Supra n 8.
134 Ibid 31-49.
135 "The Sellers Matter", ibid 486 ff.
136 PSallmann and J Willis, supran 1,40. The sanctions currently used have not "been particularly
effective deterrent[s] to overly enthusiastic law enforcement activity": LRC Criminal
Investigation supra n 5 para 287. "The voluntariness rule suffers from many deficiencies":
LRC Evidence supra n 8 para 156.
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American-style automatic exclusionary rule. 137 This is so despite the Law
Reform Commission's recognition that "[r]ights without remedies may be
no more than rhetoric" and their awareness of, and recommendation of,
many other aspects of the American system.
Why is an automatic exclusionary rule rejected when, by providing a
relatively certain sanction for rights violations, it should have the effect of
deterring (or at least tending to deter) such police misconduct? 138 The answer
given by the Law Reform Commission is instructive to Americans. They
point out that "the American rule has its limits". 39 They point to the ways
in which the United States Supreme Court has cabined the operation of
the exclusionary rule:
An accused person cannot invoke the rule if the evidence was obtained in breach
of another's rights. The rule does not apply to breaches by a private individual
rather than a state official. It does not apply so as to prevent the presentation
of illegally obtained evidence to a federal grand jury. And the rule does not apply
where the evidence is admitted not on the issue of the accused's guilt but on some
collateral issue such as his credibility as a witness. This kind of narrow distinction
between evidence proving guilt and evidence proving that an accused who says
he is not guilty is not worthy of belief as a witness tends to bring the law and
lawyers into contempt.14'
The above are exceptions to the 'automatic' exclusionary rule, and are cases
where the rule does not operate despite concededly illegal police behaviour.
The other way that the United States Supreme Court has mitigated the seeming
harshness of a rule that automatically excludes evidence in case of a violation,
is by loosening the definition of what constitutes a 'violation'.41 For example,
the Court has frequently declared that
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and
it is a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.,142
137 LRC Criminal Investigation supra n 5 para 298; LRC Evidence supra n 8 para 164(a):
"In the Commission's view, the policy concerns do not justify automatic exclusion. The
policy concerns compete and operate with varying force depending on the circumstances
of a particular case. The intention is one which a discretionary approach is the most appropriate
• .. [But]. .. once misconduct has been established, the burden should rest on the prosecution
to persuade the court that the evidence should be admitted".
138 M W Orfield, supra n 4 finding that the exclusionary rule does deter police search and
seizure violations. The former Attorney-General of Maryland agrees. United States v Leon
468 US 897, 954 (1984) per Brennan J dissenting, n 13.
139 LRC Criminal Investigation supra n 5 para 292.
140 Ibid para 293. Another significant recent example of this is United States v Leon supra
n 138 where the Court held that a search pursuant to a defective search warrant would
not lead to exclusion of the evidence since the mistake was that of the magistrate who
issued the warrant, not that of the police. As long as the police acted in reasonable good
faith reliance on the warrant, the exclusionary rule does not operate.
141 As the Law Reform Commission pointed out, '[the mandatory exclusionary rule] tempts
courts to reduce the protection of the substantive search and seizure rules by holding no
illegality has occurred in order to avoid important evidence being excluded": LRC Criminal
Investigation supra n 5 para 295.
142 United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 825 (1982) quoting Mincey v Arizona 437 US 385,
390 (1978).
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In fact, as I have previously pointed out, "these exceptions are neither few
nor well-delineated". 143 There are over twenty such exceptions and "searches
conducted pursuant to these exceptions, particularly searches incident to arrest,
automobile and 'stop and frisk' searches, far exceed searches performed
pursuant to warrant". 1' Thus, despite the 'warrant requirement', many
searches conducted without a warrant are not 'illegal' and consequently, the
exclusionary rule does not operate.
Of course, these kinds of exceptions are not necessarily inherent in a
mandatory exclusionary rule. The Court could stick to a strict warrant
requirement, and impose no 'standing' or 'use for impeachment purposes'
limitations on the operation of the exclusionary rule, as the dissenting Justices
have consistently urged. 145 Justice White, dissenting in Rakas v Illinois 146
where the court affirmed the principle that a defendant could not get
exclusionary relief if an illegal search had only violated another's rights (the
'standing' requirement), put the problem well:
If the Court is troubled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should
face the issue of that rule's continuing validity squarely instead of distorting other
doctrines in an attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in specific
cases. 1
47
Clearly, the Court's reluctance to have a clearcut rule that always applies
is due, as White J intimated, to the Justices' recognition that this will lead
to an unacceptably high number of criminals going free because the police
blundered.
Is a discretionary rule, then, the only honest answer? Certainly the
discretionary rule currently practised in Australia, which is "often mentioned
but rarely acted upon" 148 can hardly be considered an adequate safeguard
to civil liberties. The Law Reform Commission's proposals to remedy this
problem deserve serious consideration. They recommend that where the police
have broken the rules in obtaining evidence, "the court shall not admit the
evidence unless it is, on the balance of probabilities, satisfied (by the
prosecution) 49 that admission of the evidence would specifically and
substantially benefit the public interest without unduly prejudicing the rights
and freedoms of any person". Factors to consider include the seriousness
of the offence, the seriousness of the police misconduct and the extent to
which the evidence in question might have been lawfully obtained. 150 A more
recent Law Reform Commission report takes essentially the same view but
deletes the 'substantially' provision, merely requiring that "the desirability
of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of evidence that has
been [illegally] obtained." It also adds other factors to consider including
143 C M Bradley, "Two Models of the Fourth Amendment" (1985) 83 Mich L Rev 1468, 1473.
144 lbid 1475.
145 See eg, Leon supra n 138, 928 per Brennan J dissenting, where he terms the majority
view an "abandon[ment of the] exclusionary rule..
146 439 US 128 (1978).
147 Ibid 157 per White J dissenting, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens JJ concurring.
148 LRC Criminal Investigation supra n 5 para 288. The Commission also termed the then
current Australian practice as "a virtual non-exclusionary rule [which] tends to encourage
illegality, and hence reliance on illegally obtained evidence rather than other evidence".
149 Currently the defendant bears the onus of convincing the Court that the discretion should
be exercised in his favour.
150 LRC Criminal Investigation supra n 5, Appendix B Draft Legislation s 71.
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"the importance of the evidence in the proceeding" and "whether the
impropriety . . . was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person
recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 5'
The more recent proposal also imposes quite stringent requirements on
the use of admissions obtained during interrogation of persons "reasonably
suspected" of crime, 52 declaring that they are "not admissible", (and would
thus establish a mandatory exclusionary rule), unless the defendant is cautioned
as to his right to silence and possible use of his statements against him and
his admission is tape recorded. 153 Admissions "influenced by violent,
oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether toward the person who
made the admission or toward some other person, or by a threat of conduct
of that kind", are also (mandatorily) "not admissible". 54
Certainly the recommendations concerning confessional evidence seem
highly desirable. They will largely eliminate police fabrication of confessional
evidence while, at the same time, by putting confessions on tape, increase
their value in the prosecution's case. Indeed, in my view videotaping of
confessions, where practicable, would be an even more desirable
requirement. 55 The one thing missing from their proposal, evidently left out
151 LRC Evidence, supra n 8, Appendix A. Draft legislation s 119. Para 164(a) makes it clear
that the onus of proof is to be on the prosecution.
152 Or who "ought to have been reasonably suspected" LRC Evidence, supra n 8, Appendix
A. Draft legislation s 74. This is somewhat broader than the rather vague 'custody' requirement
in the United States which does not, for example, apply to a brief detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop: Berkemer v McCarty 468 US 420 (1984), or to a suspect who
volunteers to come to the police station to talk about a crime: California v Beheler 463
US 1121 (1983). Since both of these people were certainly 'reasonably suspected' of crime
the proposed Australian rules would apply to them. It is not obvious to me that such
a broad application is advisable, however.
153 LRC Evidence, supra n 8, Appendix A. Draft legislation s 74. If it was not reasonably
practicable to have made such a recording of the actual admission, a recording of the
suspect confirming the admission will suffice. The Commission report makes it clear at
para 164(b) that signed records of interview are not a substitute for a tape recording despite
a section in the Draft Legislation (s 75) which seems to suggest that they may be. The
Review Committee on Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report (February 1989)
recently proposed similar rules, requiring tape recording and cautions as to both right to
silence and counsel, but imposing a mandatory exclusionary rule only on non-tape recorded
statements: ibid para 85 F(2), 85(c)(1) and 85(T)(1).
A new Victorian statute, supra n 99 requires taping of any "confession or admission
made to an investigating official by a person who was suspected or ought reasonably to
have been suspected" of an "indictable offence" and provides, subject to exceptions, that
unrecorded statements are "inadmissible". The statute further provides that a "person in
custody" must be informed "that he or she does not have to say or do anything but that
anything the person does say or do may be given in evidence" (s.464A(3)) and that such
a person must be informed that he or she has a right to "communicate with a legal practitioner":
s 464C(l). However 'custody' does not begin unless the defendant is actually arrested or
"there is sufficient information in the possession of the investigating officer to justify [an]
arrest . . ." (s 464(l)). It is not clear whether unwarned, as opposed to untaped statements
are inadmissible, since the statute also requires that the warnings be taped, (s 464G), but
does not in terms provide that unwarned statements are inadmissible.
154 LRC Evidence, supra n 8, Appendix A Draft Legislation s 72.
155 Chief Justice Mason shares this view noting that videotaped confessions would expedite
criminal proceedings: the Canberra Times, 21 March 1989, 10. While not requiring
videorecording the Commission also made it clear that it was not prohibited: LRC Evidence,
supra n 8, para 163(a).
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in deference to, or in fear of, the police lobby, 156 is a limitation, similar
to the former Victorian statute previously discussed, 57 on the amount of
time a suspect can be held for questioning before being taken before a judge
or magistrate. In my view, the maximum period should be six hours, extendable
for six more hours by a judge or magistrate upon application by the police
for good cause shown.
Currently, in America, once the courts are satisfied that the Miranda
warnings have been given and that the statement has not been induced by
force or threats, there is a tendency to ignore other concerns. Thus, as discussed,
police falsely telling a suspect that his fingerprints have been found at the
crime scene has been ignored by the Supreme Court 58 and the prompt
arraignment requirement of Mallory v United States'59 has never been extended
to the states. Various police interrogation techniques designed to induce the
defendant to confess, which were condemned by the Court in Miranda v
Arizona'6° are now, apparently, permitted, so long as the defendant receives
the required warnings, though studies have shown that the warnings do little
to discourage suspects from making damaging admissions to police. 161 Given
that none but the most committed civil libertarian really wants to discourage
criminal suspects from making admissions to the police, it seems sensible
to focus on ensuring that such admissions are reproduced accurately in court,
at least as much as whether they were made after warnings or in response
to false promises. The proposed Bill achieves this in a way that American
law does not.
The proposed discretionary exclusionary rule as to illegal seizures of evidence
is more problematic. Certainly the Australian experience to date makes a
compelling case against discretionary, and in favour of mandatory, exclusion 62
(although the current mandatory Australian rule against involuntary
confessions also does not seem to be producing very consistent results). On
the other hand, the American mandatory rule has led to the courts waffling,
156 Personal communication, Mr Stephen Mason, Secretary and Director of Research, Law
Reform Commission, 2 March 1989. The police lobby has been highly influential in opposing
and defeating previous efforts at reform. "The Victorian Police responded to the findings
[of the Beach Inquiry] with remarkable vigour and hostility, and fought a largely successful
campaign ... to prevent the implementation of its procedural recommendations": Sallmann
and Willis, supra n I, 18.
In response to the Criminal Investigation Bill of 1981, the President of the Police Federation
of Australia and New Zealand threatened a police strike if the procedural protections of
the bill were enacted. Senator Evans (then Attorney-General) "suggested that the police
response to the Bill ... demonstrated 'a profound indifference to the constraints of existing
law' ": Reform (April 1982) 63.
157 Supra n 99.
158 Oregan v Mathiason 429 US 492 (1977).
159 354 US 449 (1957).
160 384 US 436, 452 (1966), condemning for example the 'Mutt and Jeff technique where one
questioner who is mean to the suspect is replaced by another who is warm and sympathetic.
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that the 'trial at the police station', condemned by
the High Court in Van der Meer (1988) 82 ALR 10, would be illegal in the United States
so long as the warnings were given.
161 See studies discussed in G M Caplan, "Questioning Miranda" (1985) 38 Vand L Rev 1417,
1455-1476.
162 See, Y Kamisar, W R La Fave and J H Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure (6th ed 1986)
521-524 and material cited therein discussing the inadequacy of the pre-Miranda'voluntariness'
test in the United States.
[VOLUME 18
Enforcing the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and hence to creating confusion, as to the rules which, if broken, require
exclusion.
This much can be said for a non-mandatory rule: as a matter of deterrence,
it is surely not necessary to exclude evidence every time the police err. If
the police knew that the evidence would be excluded for say two-thirds of
the time, they would probably be just as deterred from illegal searches as
they are now. The trouble with this approach is that it has to be random.
Otherwise, whatever the standards, the police will learn them and adjust
their conduct accordingly. Thus a standard, as proposed by the Law Reform
Commission, of considering the seriousness of the case will tend to have
little or no deterrent effect in serious cases because the police will know
in advance that almost anything they do will not lead to loss of evidence.
It is hard to imagine that merely shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution
will cause judges, who have never, or virtually never, excluded evidence on
the basis of an illegal search, to suddenly begin doing so with enough regularity
to ensure police compliance with the rules.
As a supplement to its discretionary rule, the Law Reform Commission
urges the creation of an external police review board to discipline the police
for rights violations. 63 The Commission believes that the combination of
this board and its discretionary exclusionary remedy will cause the rules of
criminal procedure to be "taken very seriously indeed".164 I disagree, for two
reasons. First, it is highly doubtful that convicted criminals or their lawyers
will be motivated to bring, and be successful if they do bring actions before
such a board. Such a board seems most useful as a supplement to a mandatory
exclusionary rule, to vindicate the rights of innocent people aggrieved by
police misconduct, rather than as a substitute for such a rule. Secondly,
it seems unlikely that the police department, not facing loss of evidence due
to officers' misconduct, would take the disciplinary recommendations of such
a board very seriously. As Professor Amsterdam has observed:
Realistically, no extra-departmental body has the information, resources and direct
disciplinary authority necessary to control the police effectively and consistently. 165
Consequently, I urge mandatory exclusion, despite its problems, as the
only remedy likely to deter police misconduct. If one has a standard of
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, as Australia clearly does, then
it makes no sense to say to the police - 'Well, you weren't supposed to
have conducted this search because you lacked reasonable grounds (for
example), but, since you did it, well allow you the full benefit of the evidence.
But don't do it again!' It is not the exclusionary rule, but the prohibition
against unreasonable searches that forbids the use of the evidence. When
such illegally seized evidence is offered in court, it is incumbent upon the
judge to refuse it. This is necessary, as the High Court has recognised, in
order to "discourage the use of unacceptable methods" by the police.166 Only
when a penalty is consistently attached to police rights violations will such
discouragement occur. The American experience has shown, moreover, that
163 LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5, para 301-302; Australian Law Reform Commission
Report No I Complaints Against Police (1975) Appendix F.
164 LRC Criminal Investigation, supra n 5, para 301-302.
165 A G Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment" (1973-74) 58 Minn L Rev 349,
428; H Goldstein, "Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority"
(1967) 58 Jo Crim Law, Criminology and Police Science 160, 161-162.
166 Cleland v R (1982-83) 151 CLR 1, 31 per Dawson J.
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police can learn to follow the rules in most cases such that evidence need
not be excluded very often in order to enforce the rules. One survey of studies
showed that the rule results in the non-prosecution or non-conviction of
between 0.69 per cent and 2.35 per cent of individuals arrested for felonies, 67
despite the fact that the American 'rules' can be bafflingly complicated. If
the police in America were given straightforward statutory rules that a
policeman of ordinary conscientiousness and ability could follow, the rate
of evidentiary exclusion would surely drop even more. The Australian Law
Reform Commission has achieved this in the confessions area with essentially,
two simple commands to the police: (i) caution all suspects and (ii) tape
record all statements. 68
In the search area, the problem is not so much the rules, but the failure
to enforce them. The New South Wales statutory scheme previously
discussed 69 sets forth fairly clearly the obligations of the police as to searches
and seizures. 170 I cannot believe that violations do not occur and urge that
these be discouraged by a consistent policy of evidentiary suppression
(especially in cases where no warrant was obtained). Still, I believe that,
in part, the absence of case law in the search and seizure area may be due
to the existence and clarity of the statutory rules. If similar rules can be
adopted and enforced as to confessions, Australia will have gone far down
the road to achieving the dual goals of the criminal justice system -
apprehension of the guilty while protecting individual rights.
If, however, history repeats itself and the Commonwealth and State
Parliaments fail to act then it is up to the High Court, acting as in Ireland
under the authority of the common law or, on the basis of a statutory violation,
to fill the breach and ensure police observance of traditional human rights
by commanding the courts to refuse to admit evidence obtained in the violation
of those rights or of statutory mandates.' 7 ' The fact that Australia does
not have a Bill of Rights is irrelevant, as the High Court implicitly recognised
in Ireland and Bunning v Cross. Nothing in the American Constitution requires
the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights. The
exclusionary rule is a judicial innovation developed by the Supreme Court
as a means of ensuring that police and courts respect those rights. If Australia
167 Davies, "Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of
the Exclusionary Rule"(1983) Am Bar Foun Res Jo 611, 621.
168 As discussed, supra text at n 155. 1 would amend this only slightly by stating 'videotape
all confessions' and by adding a third requirement that suspects not be held for questioning
more than six hours without the approval of a judicial officer.
169 Supra n 19.
170 One problem with the NSW statute is that it fails to limit police searches incident to arrest,
which, under the common law, extends to the entire house of the arrestee. Gillies, supra
n 22, 212. See Chimel v California 395 US 752 (1969) restricting these searches in America.
17! That the High Court has this power, subject to overruling by Parliament, seems undisputed:
McDermott v R (1947-48) 76 CLR 501. In Van der Meer (1988) 82 ALR 10, 18per Mason
CJ said that "[tihe common law balances a) the need to allow the police freedom of action
in the investigation of crime in order to ascertain the wrongdoer and b) the need to ensure
that a suspect is fairly treated and his right to silence protected". See too F A Allen, "The
Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases" [1975] U
Ill L Forum 518, 525, suggesting that the failure of legislative bodies to act in this area
is what made the United States Supreme Court step in.
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is to continue to claim that its citizens have rights with respect to the police,
then it must back up that claim with remedies for rights violations. 172
172 Chief Justice Mason recently recognised, reflecting the earlier statement of the Law Reform
Commission, that "there can be no respect for a system of justice which pays lip service
to certain rights and then does nothing to ensure that they are enforced ..." Opening
Address, Conference of the Society for the Reform of the Criminal Law, 19 March 1989,
13.
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